Daniel DePetris
While the world’s attention largely remains fixated on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, U.S. officials across the national security apparatus also have another part of the globe on their minds: the South China Sea. This vast expanse of islands, reefs, rocks and atolls is the site of contested claims among multiple Asian countries, and its maritime boundaries are about as clear as an inkblot. China, Asia’s paramount great power, has claimed about 90% of the waters for itself, and it is using its large coast to press those claims more aggressively.
Typically, China’s smaller Asian neighbors choose to register their disapproval in public statements and work to brush the long-running disputes under the rug. The last thing Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia want is a dog fight with a superior military adversary — better to settle the differences or mitigate the fallout to ensure the parties don’t stumble into a conflict.
The Philippines, however, has taken a more brash approach. Instead of de-facto permitting China to run roughshod over the seas, Manila under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is in essence giving Beijing the middle finger by sailing throughout its own exclusive economic zone, waters that extend 200 nautical miles from its shoreline. In terms of international law, this is a legitimate response. But in terms of managing the South China Sea dispute with China as peacefully as possible, the Philippines’ policy runs the risk of forcing Beijing to respond even more impetuously, potentially causing repeated clashes to mushroom into a conflict nobody wants.
Such a contingency would have extreme consequences for the United States, which is a treaty ally of the Philippines and has made clear that any attacks against Philippine armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the South China Sea would compel Washington and Manila to invoke Article 4 of the Mutual Defense Treaty. That clause, while a bit ambiguous, leaves open the option of the U.S. taking military action to come to Manila’s defense. Needless to say, a scenario in which the world’s two largest economic powers — the U.S. and China account for 42% of the globe’s gross domestic product— are shooting at each other over a bunch of uninhabited reefs is equally parts calamitous and absurd.
Fortunately, we aren’t at that point. Yet the fact that China and the Philippines continue to get into dog fights within Manila’s territorial waters isn’t encouraging. This summer has seen a series of confrontations between the two Asian powers near the Second Thomas and Sabina shoals. The most violent happened June 17, when Chinese coast guard vessels blocked a Philippine mission to send humanitarian supplies to its troops stationed at the Second Thomas Shoal. That incident involved blocking maneuvers that impeded the supply mission, with Chinese coast guard personnel brandishing sharp objects to pop the rubber boats used by the Philippines. One Filipino sailor lost a thumb, and the Chinese boarded the boats to confiscate the weapons onboard. The encounter caused an international uproar and led to a deal between Beijing and Manila to defuse tensions around the shoal without compromising on their core positions.
Regrettably, that agreement (which hasn’t been published) hasn’t done anything to address the confrontations near the Sabina Shoal, which is roughly 75 miles from the Philippines’ Palawan province. At issue is the presence of the BRP Teresa Magbanua, one of Manila’s largest ships, near the shoal, which China claims as its own. The Chinese are concerned that the Philippines is scheming to keep the large vessel in the area permanently to stake Manila’s control over the area and has responded by doing everything possible to make resupply missions to the ship as difficult for Manila as possible. On Aug. 19, two Philippine coast guard cutters sustained damage after Chinese vessels purposely collided into them. Six days later, another Philippine boat was intercepted by the Chinese. A similar event happened Aug. 31.
It’s easy to get caught up in all the dizzying back-and-forth. But the standoff between Manila and Beijing comes down to two stubborn states — one, a US ally, and the other, a power that wants to parlay its wealth and growing military power into broader influence in its neighborhood — that are unwilling to cave to each other. The Philippines has international law on its side, but international law will get it only so far when an opponent has significant ambition and larger forces at its disposal. Hard power is still the core determining factor in how international relations shake out.
Whether any long-term solution can be hashed out will be determined by these two parties. As the Philippines’ main ally, the U.S. will be tempted to step into the muck in Manila’s favor. Adm. Samuel Paparo, the combatant commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has even suggested that the Navy could escort Philippine ships to the shoals in order to ensure that sailors stationed in those areas get the supplies they need. This, however, is likely to viewed by China as highly provocative at best and an attempt by Washington to further encircle Beijing at worst.
Regardless of what the US decides to do, one question should take precedence above all others: Is a bunch of rocks worth the prospect of a conflict with China? The answer is unquestionably “no.”
(Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.)
